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PROCEEDINGS FROM TIE 1983 TAX INSTITUTE SYMPOSIUM:
CORPORATE ASSET AND CORPORATE STOCK ACQUISIONS
I. CORPORATE STOCK ACQUISITIONS
by
HARVEY FRUTKIN*
T HE PURCHASE AND SALE of a corporate business is one of the real glamour
areas of tax practice. It is almost always a big ticket item. To the seller
it is often the culmination of a lifetime's efforts. To the purchaser it is usually
the beginning of a new career or the rapid expansion of an old one. To the
lawyer it is usually a relatively big fee. So it has everything. Zol and I have
been looking forward to discussing with you the highly sophisticated choices
and decisions that are involved in the purchase and sale of a business. Zol is
going to discuss with us the purchase and sale of the corporation's assets. I
will discuss the purchase and sale of the corporation's stock. Those are the
choices: the asset deal or the stock deal, except for a statutory merger, which
is outside of the scope of our presentation today. Before we begin with the
interesting tax choices and considerations, let's take a few minutes to discuss,
generally, the differences from a non-tax perspective.
The non-tax and the tax issues will bear on the choice of the method of
sale. Often the most challenging part of the negotiations is attempting to impose
your client's will on the final decision respecting the transaction's form. Fre-
quently the buyer will want an asset deal and the seller will want a stock deal.
One or more factors relevant to the precise facts will control the decision, and
there is simply no single generalization that is valid. Probably all of you are
familiar with the factors so we will review them only very briefly.
In a stock deal, the purchaser assumes some degree of risk that he will
be overpaying for the stock. Sometimes the corporation will have liabilities
that are unknown or undisclosed at the time the contract is signed. The most
common liabilities are a tort liability that has not yet been asserted, and that
might result in a judgment in excess of insurance coverage, and an income tax
liability that results from a future audit. Such dangers to the purchaser can
*Harvey L. Frutkin, a member of the Ohio Bar, is a partner in the Cleveland, Ohio law firm of Cavitch,
Familo & Durkin Co. Mr. Frutkin received his A.B. from Ohio University and J.D., magna cum laude,
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be minimized by appropriate warranties given by the selling shareholders, who
may also wish to have sufficient funds held in escrow to back up the warran-
ties. But the initial risk is on the purchaser, and sometimes he will not be will-
ing to bear that risk even to a limited extent. In an asset deal, the purchaser
can assume, or take subject to, simply those liabilities that he agrees to take
over as part of the purchase price.
Closely related, but different, is the risk that the purchaser might be per-
sonally liable for debts it expressly disclaimed. In a stock deal there is ordinarily
no risk of any such personal liability. If there are unknown debts the purchaser
might be stuck with an over-payment for the stock, but he will not be per-
sonally liable. In an asset deal, however, a violation of the Bulk Sales Act might
make the purchaser directly liable for unbargained-for debts. Similarly, if the
purchaser in an asset deal lets himself be talked into paying the purchase price
directly to the shareholders of the selling corporation, rather than to the cor-
poration itself, the courts are likely to hold that a constructive fraud has been
practiced on the creditors of the selling corporation, with the result again that
the purchaser might be directly liable for unbargained-for debts. If the trans-
action is done correctly, this risk of unwanted liabilities simply won't exist.
Since all of us are going to do it correctly we don't have to say anything more
about that.
A third non-tax factor is the mechanical ease of closing the transation.
Ordinarily if there is only one, or a very few, shareholders, the mechanics of
closing a stock deal can be very simple. By contrast, an asset deal may require
dozens of transfer documents and hundreds of signatures. It is not unusual
for the closing to take several hours.
Sometimes one or more minority shareholders of the target corporation
will be opposed to the sale. In a stock deal, those shareholders who do not
want to sell don't have to. Their refusal might ruin the deal, but it will rarely
give them any litigating position if the deal goes through anyway. But in an
asset deal, a formal vote of the shareholders of the selling corporation is gen-
erally required under state law. Even if the requisite majority approves, the
dissenting minority may nevertheless have a statutory right to bring an action
as dissenting shareholders under state corporate law resulting in a buy-out at
an appraised price. The prospect of prolonged litigation, of course, can be a
turn-off. The other side of this coin, however, is the fact that in an asset deal
the purchaser does not inherit any unwanted shareholders. Dissenting
shareholders may have a statutory right to be bought off at an appraised price,
but they do not have any right to become shareholders of the purchasing cor-
poration. In a stock deal, on the other hand, shareholders who refuse to sell
will remain as minority shareholders in a corporation that is controlled by the
purchaser. This so-called dangling minority can be troublesome in the future,
particularly since they are likely to have a suspicious and belligerent attitude
right from the start. They might be inclined to see hanky panky even where
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it doesn't exist.
Sometimes one or more of these non-tax factors will be important.
Sometimes none of tli6m will matter greatly. But there are also tax factors,
and one or more of them will almost certainly have an impact on the particular
transaction. Frequently, the most important tax factor will be the potential
double tax in an asset deal; the tax to the corporation when it sells its assets
and the tax to the shareholders when it liquidates following the sale. If the
asset deal is incident to a liquidation, section 337 will minimize the double tax
aspect, sometimes even eliminate -it.-Sometimes it will be appropriate to
eliminate the double tax or even the single tax by not liquidating the selling
corporation, and we'll come back to that opportunity. The point is that in an
asset deal there is a potential for a double tax and this problem must be solved
in some way. By contrast, in a stock deal there is necessarily only one taxable
event - the sale of the stock.
Where the purchase price is substantially more than the book value of
the corporate assets, the purchaser will almost always want a new cost basi
for the underlying assets equal to his purchase price. In an asset deal that will
always be the result and that's an important reason why purchasers often prefer
the asset deal. The same basic result can be achieved in a stock deal, but usually
at an extra tax cost to the purchaser. That is a point that I will be discussing
in the context of the stock deal generally.
If the target corporation has a net operating loss carryover, the purchaser
will almost certainly want to benefit from it. Indeed, although he should never
admit to it, the loss carryover may be the principal reason he is interested in
the target. In a stock deal there is at least a chance, and perhaps a good chance,
that the purchaser will be able.to benefit from the purchased corporation's
carryover. Again, I will discuss that in some detail. In an asset- deal, by con-
trast, there is absolutely no chance whatsoever. The loss carryover will remain
with the selling corporation. If the corporation liquidates, the carryover will
evaporate.
It is not at all unusual when an entire corporate business is being sold
that the target corporation has one or more assets that are not to go along
with the deal. Either the purchaser does not want the asset or the shareholders
of the target corporation do not want to part with it. For example, the cor-
poration may have excessive cash or marketable securities that the purchaser
does not want to pay for. Or the corporation may own the real estate used
in the business and the shareholders may want to keep it as a long-term rental
property. In a stock deal, getting the so called "unwanted asset" out of the
corporation and into the hands of the selling shareholders may pose a difficult
problem. In an asset deal, there is complete flexibility. The selling corporation
simply does not sell the unwanted asset. And if the sale is incident to a plan
of liquidation, the unwanted asset is distributed in liquidation to the shareholders
along with the proceeds of the sale.
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Recapture can play a leading role in the choice of method of sale. If the
target corporation has depreciable personal property that is worth more than
its adjusted basis, or depreciable real property that it has depreciated on one
of the rapid methods, or investment credit property that it has owned for less
than the full investment credit period, recapture is very likely to be an added
tax burden to someone. In an asset deal that added tax burden will be borne
by the selling corporation. In a stock deal there will be no added tax burden
to anyone unless the purchaser wants a new basis equal to the purchase price
of the stock. In that even recapture will come into play, and it will be an added
cost to the purchaser. Sometimes the price is mighty high - and so are the
stakes. If only one of the parties is aware of this problem, you can be pretty
sure that the other party will be stuck with it. When both parties are aware
of the problem, and if they are both relatively civilized about such things, the
purchase price will be adjusted in some way that reflects the sharing of this
added cost.
Often a major part of the purchase price will be payable in installments
over a number of years. If so, it will be extremely important to the selling cor-
poration and to its shareholders, if the seller is liquidated, that the gain be report-
able on the installment method. In the old days, before 1980 that is, that was
a major factor that virtually dictated the use of the stock deal. Now, however,
installment reporting can be equally available in both types of transactions.
More about this later.
The last tax factor, one that will only rarely be relevant, relates to collap-
sibility. If the target corporation is a collapsible corporation', the consequences
of collapsibility will differ depending upon the nature of the transaction. In
a stock deal, collapsibility presents the risk that the gain realized by the
shareholders will be taxed as ordinary income rather than long-term capital
gain. In an asset deal, collapsibility may mean that section 337 is not available
to the selling corporation. Both consequences are pretty serious, but they are
different. The happy note is that few purchases and sales of entire corpora-
tions involve collapsible corporations, so we rarely have to face this complexity.
The first alternative that we are going to discuss is the taxable purchase
and sale of a corporate business by way of the purchase and sae _ofitsshares-.
The typical scenario in this respect is that the corporation's stock is transferred
from the present owner or owners to a purchaser. In exchange the sellers receive
cash or promissory notes from the purchaser, or a combination of cash and
notes. The result, if no other steps are taken (such as a section 338 election),
is that the corporation's business continues without change. The corporation
continues as the owner of all of its own assets and as the party responsible
for its liabilities, and it simply goes forward; it just has new owners.
As a point of beginning, let's look at a hypothetical corporation. The cor-
poration is owned by Mr. A, an 85% shareholder, and by Mr. B, who owns
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the remaining 15%. Mr. C is the potential purchaser of all of the shares and
the parties agree that the corporate business is worth $2 million. The corpora-
toin's net worth is $1,500,000. There are, however, elements of value not appear-
ing on the balance sheet. The fair market value of machinery and equipment
is $75,000 more than depreciated book value, and the corporation's real estate
is worth $175,000 more than its book value. If my arithmetic is correct, that
means that the corporation is perceived by the parties to have a good will or
going concern value of $250,000. That is, book net worth of $1,500,000, plus
extra value in "hard" assets of $250,000, plus good will of $250,000 equals
$2 million as the grand total. The parties agree that the corporation is worth
that $2 million figure and that is the amount that Mr. C is willing to pay for
the stock.
Does the purchaser, Mr. C, have atiything to worry about from a non-tax
business perspective? The first potential risk is that the corporation might have
liabilities that are not shown on its balance sheet. For example, what if the
corporation is audited by the'Internal Revenue Service and is found to owe
a federal income tax deficiency resulting from its business operations in a prior
year or years? That liability is unknown to the purchaser and perhaps even
unknown to the sellers. Nevertheless, that liability diminishes the value of the
corporation, and thus the value of the stock being purchased. The risk of over-
payment for the stock can be minimized by app rt warranties by the sellers,
and perhaps by an escrow of the portion ofth--purcaiz mentioned
a moment ago. But the risk of overpayment is there. On the other hand, Mr.
C, as the purchaser of the corporation's shares, does not himself personally
become liable for the debts of the purchased corporation. He may overpay,
but his risk is limited in any event to the amount that he does pay.
The purchaser need not fear litigation, for example, if Mr. B, the 15%
owner, doesn't want to sell his shares. The purchaser does run the risk, however,
of the non-selling shareholder remaining on as an unfriendly minority voice
in the business enterprise with whatever heckling or other problems that might
generate.
Now to move on to the more interesting areas, namely the income tax)
characteristics of the purchase andsale of the corporation's shar s.From the
-,-viewpoint-of the-sellers, Mr. A and Mr. B, we can dispose of two considera-
tions very quickly. First, there is no double tax to the sellers. They sell their
stock and they are taxed, almost always at capital gain rates. The corporation
doesn't sell anything and it is not taxed. Thus, only one level of taxation is
involved. Second, if the purchase price is paid on a deferred basis, the sellers
can report their gain and pay the tax on the installment method of reporting.
The tax obligation is satisfied gradually over the years as the purchase price
is received. Not all of the tax considerations are nearly as straightforward.
An important pitfall is the collapsible corporation-danger, and what might
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either be a pitfall or an opportunity is the prospect for preservation of the pur-
chased corporation's net operating loss carryover. We will discuss the collap-
sibility problem first. The collapsible corporation danger doesn't arise fre-
quently, but when it does, it can have devastating tax results. What collapsi-
bility does in the context of a purchase and sale of stock is to convert the seller's
gain from capital gain to ordinary income. Why? How does it do that? Where
does it fit into the pattern of taxation? What purpose does the collapsibility
provision serve? The idea is to prevent the shareholders from bailing out at
the usual capital gain rates in a case where the proceeds of the sale really repre-
sent future corporate ordinary income, if such bailout is intended as a matter
of fact from the outset.
For example, in Computer Services Corporation, 63 T.C. 327 (1974), the
shareholders formed a corporation for the purpose of developing computer
software used for the preparation of income tax returns. They called their system
"Computax." At some point early in the venture, the shareholders had a view
toward an eventual sale of the corporation's stock to Commerce Clearing House,
which we know of course as CCH. The software was developed to the point
where the corporation could look forward to substantial corporate ordinary
income if it simply remained in business with no change in ownership. At that
point, the pre-existing view to bail out by sale of the shares was fulfilled. The
stock was sold to CCH. The selling shareholders reported their gain as long
term capital gain, and of course we know that Computax, has become a very
successful system for preparation of tax returns. It so happens that the collap-
sible corporation result was not found by the tax court to apply in the Com-
puter Services Corporation case, but only on the technical ground that the view
of the shareholders to sell was not formed until the production of the software
was already completed. Thus, the shareholders were successful in reporting their
gain as capital and not ordinary. In the time that we have we cannot go much
farther in discussing collapsibility, but we have the birdseye overview. Suffice
it to say that the provisions of section 341 are relatively complex. That's not
true - they are extremely complex. Fortunately, the collapsible corporation
problem is rare, but we must be alert to it and watch for it on behalf of the
selling shareholders and review section 341 where collapsibility might be a
problem.
A second area of concern is preserving the net operating loss carryover,
if any, of the target corporation. T!he notion here is that if the target corpora-
tion had loss years prior to the purchase and sale of its stock, those losses can
generate future tax benefits. Net operating losses can generally be carried back
three years to offset prior income and any excess can be carried over and
deducted against future profits for fifteen years, under section 172. Also, under
the general rule the carryback to prior years can be relinquished, so that more
losses are available to carry over into the future. If the stock were not sold
and the old ownership thus remained in place, the carryover of net operating
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losses could result in substantial future-year deductions. But what effect has
the purchase and sale of the corporation's shares on the .potential net operating
loss carryover? Will the loss carryover remain alive so that it represents a valuable
asset or benefit to the purchaser? As is almost always the case, there is no yes
or no answer. There are statutory hurdles standing in the way, but they can
be overcome, depending on the facts. In short, there is an opportunity here
for the purchaser, but the survival of the net operating loss carryover is far
from automatic.
The first hurdle is the broad rule of section 269. The focus of this rule
is the principal purpose for the acquisition of control of the target corpora-
tion. Section 269 applies also in another context, namely in a tax-free merger
or other tax-free asset acquisition. But our concern is the purchase of control
of the loss corporation by means of a purchase of its stock. For section 269,
"control" is defined to mean the ownership of at least 50% of the total voting
power of all of the target's shares, or the ownership of at least 50% of the
total value of all of the outstanding shares. In our context of a purchase and
sale of an entire business the control definition will certainly be met. What
then is the extent of the section 269 problem? If the acquisition of control of
the target corporation has as its principal purpose the avoidance or evasion
of federal income taxes, by means of obtaining that operating loss carryover
of the target, or indeed, any other tax benefit associated with the target, the
carryover or other benefit may be disallowed. The rule simply is that if you
want the benefit of the net operating loss carryover enough, that is if you are
sufficiently greedy, and your greediness is apparent, that benefit may be denied.
The difficlt problem with this analysis is that it involves a factual question
of the purchaser's motivation. Generally speaking, the bad tax avoidance pur-
pose is ik ly-to be raised as an issue in any case where the ultimate result of
the purchase of the shares is to make use of an operating loss carryover that
might otherwise expire.
Let's take a simple hypothetical example. Let's say that our XYZ Cor-
poration is engaged in a steel warehouse business. What if XYZ had a signifi-
cant operating loss carryover? I recognize that a few minutes ago I said that
XYZ had substantial good will, so if the hypothetical is inconsistent, let's change
it. Mr. C, the prospective purchaser, has never been in the steel business. In-
stead he has a paint manufacturing corporation, C corporation. C corpora-
tion makes a nice profit. Mr. C causes his paint company, C corporation, to
be the purchaser of the stock of XYZ Corporation. The purchaser then transfers
its paint business to XYZ Corporation. The target's carryover offsets the cur-
rent profits of the paint business as the years go by. Does it work? Very likely
not. The direct and immediate use of the target corporation's net operating
loss carryover against the purchaser's income from a completely separate
business will almost certainly fail under the broad reach of section 269.
If Mr. C attempts to prove that he did not have the principal tax avoidance
1983]
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purpose, fine; all relevant facts will be considered, including the objective
evidence of what happened and the taxpayer's testimony on motivation. But
the rule clearly is broad enough to preclude the use of the carryover in many,
many cases. And in Mr. C.'s case, success is just not likely. The question might
fairly be asked, is there any sure way around section 269? If control of a loss
corporation is purchased does section 269 necessarily knock out the net operating
loss carryover? Presumably, if the business is kept intact, and its carryover
is not paired up with the profits of another business, and the purchaser simply
makes the purchased business profitable, then there is no indication of the prin-
cipal tax avoidance purpose. With no apparent hanky-panky, the loss carryover
ought to survive under those circumstances. But section 269 remains a power-
ful weapon.
There is an issue in this area that is not firmly resolved. That issue is to
what extent, if at all, can section 269 be used to disallow losss incurred by
the target corporation after the purchase and sale of shares? Now we are not
talking about the business losses before our purchaser became the owner, but
losses incurred thereafter. Is section 269 a tool available to the government
in this context? Zanesville Investment Company v. Commissioner, 335 F.2d
507 (6th Cir. 1964), rev'g 38 T.C. 406 (1962) directly addresses this issue of
post-acquisition losses. In that case a profitable newspaper corporation bought
the stock of an unprofitable mining corporation. Consolidated returns were
filed on which two kinds of post-acquisition losses were reported. Operating
losses generated by the mining corporation after the purchase showed up on
the tax return, but in addition, losses from the sale of assets were also reported
as an offset against newspaper profits. The Service attacked the return on the
grounds that the principal purpose of the acquisition was the avoidance of
federal income tax. The tax court agreed that section 269 applied. The precise
holding of the tax court was that once an acquisition has been found to be
for the tax avoidance purpose, section 269 is triggered with respect to all losses.
All deductions that would not have otherwise have been available for the pur-
chaser are lost. This is a very broad holding. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
reversed the Tax Court with an equally broad holding. The Sixth Circuit held
that all post-acquisition losses were deductible and that section 269 simply did
not apply to post-acquisition losses.
There are other court of appeals cases that take a somewhat more
sophisticated, better reasoned approach. The cases in other circuits seem to
lean toward disallowing any loss under section 269, even a post-acquisition loss,
if and to the extent that securing the benefit of that loss was the principal pur-
pose of the acquisition. But the tax benefit of unanticipated future losses such
as those incurred in an unanticipated sale of assets at a loss will likely be allowed
to stand. To the extent that courts have gone separate ways, as they have, the
issue remains unresolved. The Service is likely to try again. But only time and
future decisions will give us a firm answer to the question.
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Theother hurdle in preserving the net operating loss carryover of the target
is section 382(a). This section does not depend to any extent on the finding
of a bad tax avoidance purpose for the acquisition. The rule of section 382(a)
is simply that if there is a requisite shift of control the target corporation must
continue to carry on substantially the same trade or business as it conducted
before the change in stock ownership. If it does not carry on substantially the
same business, then it entirely loses its loss carryover, and therefore the pur-
chaser has no benefit available from prior year's losses. There is no question
of motivation here. If the business-is-not-substantially the same, the carryover
disappears.-..
What is a shift in control for section 382(a) purposes? Again, in terms
of our discussion of a complete change in ownership, there is the requisite shift
without question. Technically, the shift of control is determined by looking
at the interests at the end of the year of the ten persons with the greatest stock
ownership. If their aggregate ownership has changed by at least 50 percentage
points there has been a shift of control. We are assuming that has taken place.
The only remaining question is whether or not the business of the corporation
is substantially the same. The business continued by the target corporation must
be substantially the same, but it need not be exactly the same as before the
acquisition of its stock. Clearly some modification in the business is permit-
ted. As in so many other cases, it is a matter of degree.
The section 382(a) rule is scheduled to be changed, effective for transactions
after June 30, 1984. The change was actually made under the 1976 Tax Reform
Act, but the effective date was postponed. If the new section 382(a) does come
in as of June 30, 1984, as scheduled, it will put the focus completely on the
extent of the change in ownership of the target corporation. If the change of
ownership is complete, as we are assuming it will be in our type of transactions,
then the entire net operating loss carryover will evaporate. If the change is only
partial, the carryover will be cut back proportionately under a schedule con-
tained in the statue. But a continuance of the business or a change in the business
will no longer be relevant. The only question is whether the new rule will go
into effect in 1984 or be postponed again, and I don't know the answer.
To briefly sumiiiarizeif the target's very same business is continued, the
net operating loss carryover is probably safe. It remains alive because it meets
both of the relevant tests under the current rules. The subjective test of section
269, relating to principal tax avoidance purposes, is met, since the fact that
no change in the business occurs seems to fly in the face of tax avoidance.
The purchaser bought the business because he wanted to run that business.
The objective test of section 382(a) is met simply because the business is not
changed, and the loss is thus preserved.
There may be assets of the target corporation which are unwanted as a
part of the deal. It may be that the sellers of the shares would like to retain
19831
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for themselves an asset of the target corporation, such as an investment in
marketable securities, or real estate, or some other property that is not critical
to the operation of the business. The purchaser may not want to buy and pay
for that kind of unneeded asset, even if the sellers were willing to part with
it. This is not a problem at all in the asset deal, since the assets the selling cor-
poration doesn't wish to sell can simply be retained by it as part of the trans-
action. But in a stock deal, what are the alternatives in stripping out unwanted
assets prior to or as part of the sale?
An obvious alternative, but one usually to be avoided, is the distribution
of the unwanted assets as a dividend to the selling shareholders prior to the
purchase and sale of stock. That is, take the property out of corporate solu-
tion as a dividend. Have the selling shareholders receive that property before
they sell their stock. The obvious problem with the dividend alternative is that
it requires a distribution that is taxable as ordinary income to the shareholders.
If the selling shareholder is itself a corporation, the dividend treatment won't
hurt much at all because of the 85% dividends received deduction available
to corporations. But for an individual shareholder the dividend route is likely
to be too expensive for serious consideration.
A second reason to avoid a pre-sale dividend alternative is that the divi-
dend might be taxed to the purchaser. This will almost certainly be the result
where the contract for purchase and sale has already been signed and then pro-
perty is distributed by the corporation to a shareholder who is committed to
sell his shares. Under those facts the distribution will likely be taxed as a divi-
dend to the purchaser and then treated constructively as additional considera-
tion paid to the seller. That unanticipated tax to the purchaser by virtue of
a distribution of assets to a seller would really make for a bad day for the pur-
chaser. Even where the purchase and sale agreement was not already executed,
some appellate courts have held that the pre-sale distribution is properly taxed
as a dividend to the purchaser. The upshot is that a dividend prior to the sale
of the target's shares is just not a good way of stripping out the unwanted assets.
Fortunately, there is a better way, namely a Zenz transaction with which
you are probably familiar. In the Zenz transaction, a sale of some shares is
coupled with a redemption of the rest of the shares. For example, assume that
the shareholders in our prior example who are going to sell, namely Mr. A
and Mr. B, want to keep the real estate. The real estate is worth $675,000,
just slightly more than one-third of the assumed purchase price of $2 million.
A and B want to keep it either because it is only an investment completely
unrelated to the business, or perhaps because they will be able to lease the pro-
perty back to XYZ Corporation. The deal they strike is that Mr. C will pay
for two-thirds of the total number of XYZ shares. That is, C will buy roughly
66% of Mr. A's stock and roughly 66% of Mr. B's stock. The rest of the deal
is that immediately after the sale the target corporation will redeem the rest
of A's and B's shares. The redemption price consists of the real estate, which
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is deeded over proportionately to A and to B.
What happens when the smoke clears? To the extent that Mr. A and Mr.
B sold their shares outright to C they have the usual sale or exchange treat-
ment with its capital gain result. The subsequent redemption of the balance
of the shares of A and B results in a complete termination of the interest of
each of them in the corporation. As you know, the complete termination of
interest fits into the statutory pigeonhole of section 302(b)(3). Section 302
generally tells us when a redemption of shares will be treated as a sale or ex-
change as opposed to an ordinary income dividend. The complete termination
of interest does qualify as a sale or exchange under section 302(b)(3). So A
and B have capital gain also to the extent of the value of the real estate they,
receive. They end up with $2 million worth of assets, consisting of the pur-
chase price from C and the real estate, and all of their gain is capital.
Occasionally it will be appropriate to redeem out only one of the
shareholders. For example, what if Mr. B would like to retain the investment
portfolio of XYZ Corporation? The investments are worth $300,000, which
is exactly 15% of the total value of the corporation. Mr. B owns exactly 15%
of the stock, which will make the example work very well. The appropriate
-step would be for the purchaser to buy A's 85% stock interest and for the in-
vestment securities to be distributed to Mr. B in redemption of his stock. Under
the rules we just talked about each shareholder has capital gain. The purchaser
ends up with all of the outstanding stock and pays only for the assets needed
in the business.
Respecting the favorable capital gain result to the selling shareholders, two
sidelights are helpful. One is that it clearly doesn't endanger the transaction
at all that the redemption takes place as part of a prearranged part-sale and
part-redemption plan. It's perfectly permissible even if it is all prearranged and
it happens simultaneously. The other helpful point is that the technique appears
to work even if only a very tiny portion of the stock is actually sold to the
purchaser. In Herbert Enoch v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 781 (1972) only 5%
of the stock was sold to the outsider, and 95% was redeemed. It worked fine.
There is, however, a potential tax impact to the target corporation, and
thus indirectly to the purchaser, in this part-sale part-redemption plan. Under
the current rules as "TEFRAized" in 1982, the distribution of appreciated assets
to a shareholder generally generates a tax to the distributing corporation, unless
such distribution is made as a part of a liquidation. Since the redemption por-
tion of our Zenz transaction is nota complete liquidation of the target, if the
assets distributed in redemption are indeed appreciated over their bases to the
target, gain will be recognized by the target just as if such assets had been sold
on the date of distribution. We are going to come back to that problem in
a moment when we discuss the availability of the new section 338 election. But
absent the election, this clearly could be a disadvantage to the purchaser who
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participates in the Zenz type of transaction.
Now let's move to the important issue of the purchaser's basis disadvan-
tage in the stock sale and how it can be solved under new section 338 of the
Code. The stock deal can result in a basis disadvantage from the purchaser's
viewpoint that normally does not happen in an asset deal. In an asset deal any
portion of the purchase price for a particular asset that exceeds its book value
will be included in the purchaser's basis for that asset. If inventory is purchased
for more than book, the additional purchase price will be recovered by the
purchaser through its cost of goods sold. If depreciable assets are purchased
at a price greater than book, the purchaser will have a higher basis for its future
depreciation deductions.
The benefit of that higher basis to the purchaser does not automatically
happen in a stock deal. Again, let's refer back to the hypothetical XYZ Cor-
poration balance sheet. The $2 million purchase price was determined in part
by virtue of machinery, equipment, and real estate values not appearing on
the balance sheet. In other words, those assets are worth more than their
depreciated bases to the target corporation. But after the stock purchase, the
target has the same identical tax basis in its assets as it had before the pur-
chase. It doesn't help the purchaser at all that part of his purchase price went
for values such as real estate, machinery and equipment that aren't reflected
on the balance sheet.
Is there anything the purchaser can do? Of course there is or we wouldn't
spend any time on this. There is something the purchaser can do if the pur-
chaser is a corporation. What a purchasing corporation can do is make an elec-
tion under section 338, which was added to the code in 1982. The new section
338 election procedure is a substitute for the old procedure under section
334(b)(2) for the liquidation of the purchased subsidiary corporation. You
remember section 334(b)(2), the procedure was to have the target corporation
liquidated into the purchaser, its parent, within two years after the purchase.
The statute gave the purchaser a stepped-up basis in the assets received from
the target in a liquidation. That's out now; under the new rules the liquidation
of the target is irrelevant. What is relevant is the election procedure under sec-
tion 338 but some of the old learning still applies, as we will see.
An overview of section 338 is the appropriate point at which to start.
Broadly speaking, the section 338 election has a twofold effect. The first step
under section 338 is that the target corporation is treated as having sold its
assets in a sale governed under section 337. The second step is that the target
is then treated as a brand new corporation with the basis of its assets stepped-
up to reflect the purchase price paid for its stock by the purchasing corpora-
tion. Thus, a step-up occurs, which is the main point of making the election,
but only at whatever tax cost is triggered by the constructive section 337 sale
which is deemed to have occurred.
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Now to the details. It is important to remember that the section 338 elec-
tion is available-only-ifthe purchaser is a corporation. An individual is not
eligible to make the election. In our example, let's get rid of Mr. C as the pur-
chaser. The purchaser has to be C Corporation, either a pre-existing corpora-
tion or one formed just for this occasion. This brings me to a point that can
be made succinctly but only to a group of tax practitioners. Congress has said
that Kimbell-Diamond Milling Co. v. Commissioner, 14 T.C. aff'dper curiam,
187 F.2d 718 (5th Cir.), cert. denied 342 U.S. 827 (1951) is dead. That's com-
forting. We know that section 334(b)(2) is out; it's been repealed and there
is no other way to achieve the asset step-up in basis to reflect the purchase
price for the stock. The only possibility is the section 338 election. That's what
the committee report to section 338 says. And I believe it.
Assume for section 338 purposes that we have a purchasing corporation.
Next we need a qualified purchase of the stock of the target corporation. The
purchaser must acquire at least 80% of the voting power and 80% of the
total number of all other shares, except for non-voting preferred shares, which-
don't count. The acquisition must take place within a twelve month period.
The section 338 election must be filed within seventy-five days after the date
of acquisition of the 80% interest. The election is to be made in accordance
with regulations that we don't have yet, and it will be an irrevocable election.
The target is then treated as though it had sold all of its assets in a bulk sale
at the end of the day on which the stock purchase occurred. The section 337
rules govern the tax impact of that supposed asset sale.
Section 337 shelters the target from recognizing taxable gain generally,
but there are somewery important exceptions such as depreciation and other
cost recovery recapture. It is important to note that recapture fully applies;
section 337 is not a shield against recapture, which can be very expensive. Note
further that the recapture expense falls in effect on the purchaser. This is com-
pletely different from the result in an asset deal, where recapture remains the
problem of the seller. Here it is the purchaser's problem.,
Under section 338 the target is treated as if it had purchased all of the
assets at the same price that the purchasing corporation paid for the target's
stock. The purchase price is allocated among the target's assets, thus giving
the target a desired new stepped-up basis in each asset.
There are twe-tails about the allocation of the stock purchase price among
the assets. Thfirst is that the Code says that the allocation is to be made under
regulations to bpricribed by the Treasury. Again, we don't yet have the regula-
tions. Presumably, however, the allocation will be made the same way as would
have occurred under the old section 334(b)(2) liquidation rules. The section
334(b)(2) rule was that the purchase price was allocated by the purchaser pro-
portionately according to the relative fair market value of each of the assets
received in the liquidation. An important feature of that allocation was that
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good will had to be taken into account as an asset, if and to the extent that
good will was involved. That is probably just exactly what the new section 338
allocation will be also.
In terms of our XYZ example, you will recall that we imagined good will
as one of the assets involved. Under the section 338 election, the purchasing
corporation would decide in the first instance the extent of the allocation of
the purchase price to good will. For example, if the purchaser followed the
figures as we had supposed them to be, there would be an allocation of $250,000
worth of purchase price to good will. It is not inconceivable that the purchaser
would allocate some amount less than $250,000 to good will. For example,
the purchaser might want to take the position, perhaps justifably, that the value
of good will is only $100,000. If that indeed were the allocation to good will
there might be an extra $150,000 to be allocated to the depreciable assets, in-
ventory, or other assets that would generate a tax benefit to the purchaser.
This is a problem under section 334(b)(2); it is likely to continue as a problem
under section 338, and I suppose that aggressive taxpayers are well-advised to
continue to provoke the debate if the facts are favorable to them.
The other important detail respecting the allocation of the purchase price
applies where the purchaser acquires less than all of the stock of the target.
In other words, where the purchasing corporation has acquired the requisite
80% control but it owns less than 100%. In this situation the purchase price
to be allocated among the assets is grossed-up to what the purchase price would
have been for all of the stock. For example, if $90,000 were the price for 90%
of the shares, then $100,000 would have been the price for all of the shares.
It is the $100,000 grossed-up figure that is allocated to the assets under the
section 338 election.
When all is said and done under section 338, the purchaser ends up with
a brand new corporation for all tax purposes. A final income tax return must
be filed for the corporation which supposedly disappeared. All of its tax attri-
butes are gone. If the target had a net operating loss carryover, it can do no
further good to anyone. It's disappeared. The new corporation that supposedly
appeared must select a new fiscal year as would any new corporation. And
it doesn't matter whether the target corporation is actually liquidated.
An important aspect of section 338 is that it includes built-in consistency
rules designed to avoid manipulation of the election procedure. The manipula-
tion that is seen as a potential danger is that the parties might split the trans-
action into two or more separate parts. For example, the parties might try to
have an asset purchase first, involving only some assets, followed by a stock
purchase to which the section 338 election would apply. To the extent of the
preliminary asset purchase, the purchaser would get its stepped-up basis without
having to pay the tax cost of depreciation recapture. Under the parties' agree-
ment the burden of recapture would remain with the seller to the extent generated
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by those particular assets. The parties would then hope to shift the recapture
burden to the purchaser by means of the stock sale and section 338 election
to the extent generated by the remaining assets of the target. Or perhaps the
purchaser does not intend to make the section 338 election at all. Instead it
may just want to purchase some assets for the step-up and then preserve the
net operating loss carryover of the target upon the later purchase of its shares.
Under the consistency rules such schemes really won't work. In effect,
the statute creates a period of time, quite sensibly called the "consistency
period," during which all purchases of assets from, and all purchases of the
stock of, the target must be treated in the same way. The consistency period
is at least two years long. The basic rule is that the consistency period begins
one year before the twelve month acquisition period. You will recall that acquisi-
tion of contol must occur within one twelve-month acquisition period. The con-
sistency period begins one year earlier. The consistency period then continues
on through the date on which the control is acquired and extends for another
year beyond the date of acquisition of control, so it's at least two years long
and maybe as long as three years under the normal computation.
Furthermore, the'consistency period can be even longer. Section 338 gives
the Service the discretion to extend the consistency period to include any time
during which it determines that a "manipulation plan" was in effect. I expect
we'll see cases on this issue of when the Service can or cannot extend the con-
sistency period.
In any event, what is the effect of the consistency period? Very broadly
speaking, the effect is that the purchaser will be deemed to have made a sec-
tion 338 election even if it did not actually do so. This would be the result
where the purchaser first bought assets from the target during the consistency
period and then acquired the stock but made no election. There are certain
exceptions to this rule. For example, if the acquisition of assets was simply
a purchase in the ordinary course of business by the purchaser, there is no pro-
blem. Outside such exceptions, the purchasing corporation will be deemed to
have made the election. The essential effect will be to have the entire trans-
action treated consistently - one deal for tax purpose, to which section 338
applies.
There are a host of details surrounding the consistency rules, and we won't
cover all of them. But, an important note to all of this is that section 338 also
requires consistency in the treatment of affiliates of the .target corporation. The
best rule of thumb is to expect the consistency rules to govern in any situation
where there is both a stock purchase and a sale of assets, whether those assets
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Let's go back now for a moment to the Zenz transaction - part sale and
part redemption - a relate it to section 338. How can the two be combined?
Suppose in our XYZ corporation example that Mr. B wants to retain the target's
investment portfolio as we said before. In order to accomplish that, C Cor-
poration, the purchaser, is going to buy Mr. A's 85% stock interest, but the
investments will be distributed to Mr. B in redemption of his shares. Within
seventy-five days after the transaction, C Corporation will make the section
338 election. Assume for the moment that the investments are appreciated in
that their $300,000 fair market value exceeds the target's bases in those in-
vestments. Section 338 is a critical election in this pattern, to preclude a recogni-
tion of gain to XYZ corporation on the distribution of its appreciated asset
to Mr. B. As I mentioned a moment ago, one aspect of TEFRA was to broaden
the rule imposing a tax on the distributing corporation if the distribution is
of an appreciated asset. Under the old rules the section 338 election would not
have been critical since a distribution of an appreciated asset did not generate
a tax at the corporate level so long as the shareholder receiving the distribu-
tion was at least a 10% shareholder and had been for a year. But that rule
is gone and it can't help us now. Fortunately, if the section 338 election is made
the transaction can be structured to meet the needs of all of the parties.
Lastly, it probably doesn't matter for section 338 purposes that the pur-
chaser's 80076 or more control position arises in part by means of a redemp-
tion rather than entirely by purchase. The precise issue was raised in Madison
Square Garden Corp. v. Commissioner, 500 F.2d 611 (2nd Cir. 1974), aff'g
58 T.C. 619 (1972) under the old section 334(b)(2) rules. In that case the
purhcaser bought 60% of the target's stock, but by virtue of the redemption
of some shareholders' interest the purchaser in fact owned more than the needed
80076, and thus met the old rules. Under the same facts, the purchaser presumably
would now have requisite control for purposes of the section 338 election. So
long as the purchasing corporation ends up in the 80% control position, it
presumably need not have purchased that entire 8006 interest.
Those are the major considerations in the purchase and sale of stock. We
could spend as much time as we wanted on this topic, but at least we hit the
high points, and that's all we can do today.
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II. CORPORATE ASSET ACQUISITIONS
by
ZOLMAN CAVITCH*
We are now going to talk about the asset deal in contrast to the stock
deal that Harvey dealt with. The big problem in an asset deal, as you know,
is avoiding the double tax. The most common way to do this, of course, is
to utilize the protection of section 337, one of the most important and useful
sections of the entire Internal Revenue Code. All of you are familiar with sec-
tion 337 and how it operates. If a corporation adopts a plan of complete liquida-
tion and actually distributes to its shareholders all of its assets within twelve
months after the adoption of the plan, then most kinds of gains and losses
realized by the corporation during that twelve month period will not be recogniz-
ed for tax purposes. In effect the gain or loss recognized at the shareholders
level on a liquidation will satisfy the Service's passion for collecting a tax, at
least a part of that passion. Section 337 is a pretty straightforward provi-
sion. It is not overly complex, like collapsibility, aild it eliminates all or most
of the taxable gain at the corporate level.
Let's focus on some of the potential trouble areas. In order to come within
section 337, the sale of the particular asset or assets must occur after the adop-
tion of the plan of liquidation. The plan is normally adopted by the formal
act of the shareholders, either at a meeting or by an action in writing under
relevant state law. But the shareholders will not want to adopt a plan of liquida-
tion unless there is reasonable certainty that a sale will take place, and there
is usually no such certainty unless a contract of sale is signed. In some circum-
stances, however, particularly where real estate is involved, the mere signing
of the contract may constitute the sale. So how do we get off this merry-go-
round? One very helpful way is furnished by the treasury regulations themselves.
If the sale is made on the same day that the plan of liquidation is adopted,
it doesn't matter that the sale actually occurs first. Section 337 will still apply.
Thus, if a contract is signed and on that very same day the shareholders adopt
the -plan of liquidation, there is no need to be concerned that the contract itself
might constitute a sale. That's the foolproof method when the shareholders
want to make sure there is a deal before they adopt a plan of liquidation. If
for any reason this alternative is not available, the contract should be suffi-
ciently conditional to preclude the argument that it constitues a sale. For
example, a clause stating that the seller's obligations under the contract are
conditioned on its shareholders adopting the plan of liquidation within a stated
time should avoid this danger.
*Zoleman Cavitch, a member of the Ohio Bar, is a partner in the Cleveland, Ohio law firm of Cavitch,
Familo & Durkin, Co. Mr. Cavitch received his A.B. and J.D. degrees from the University of Michigan.
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The usual rule under section 337 requires that all assets be distributed in
liquidation within twelve months after the adoption of the plan. But what if
it's not feasible to complete the distributions within twelve moths? For exam-
ple, some shareholders cannot be located or the corporation has a tax refund
case pending and it would be burdensome to assign the corporation's rights
to its shareholders.
In these and similar situations it is possible to utilize a liquidating trust.
That is, a trust may be created by the shareholders or even by the corporate
officers if they are authorized in that respect by the plan of liquidation, and
the corporation's assets may be assigned to that trust within the requisite twelve
month period. The terms of the trust should, of course, spell out the condi-
tions for distribution to the shareholders. If this trust device is utilized, care
must be taken to avoid its being classified as an association, that is as a cor-
poration itself. If so reclassified, it is simply a continuation of the selling cor-
poration and there has been no liquidation within the twelve month period.
Thus, the trust should not conduct a business and should have a limited life.
Furthermore, if the safety of a ruling from the National Office is desired, con-
sult Revenue Procedure 80-54, 1980-2 C.B. 848, for the relevant criteria.
Where the difficulty in making complete distribution within twelve months
is attributable to the inability to identify and pay all of the corporation's debts,
the relatively easy answer is right in the statute. The corporation is permitted
to retain assets beyond the twelve month period solely for the purpose of paying
debts. But the retained assets must be reasonable in amount in relation to the
estimated unpaid debts, and the particular assets must be specifically set apart,
whatever that means, for that purpose. Now this requires some formal action
by the shareholders, directors, or officers. In Vern Realty v. Commissioner,
58 T.C. 1005 (1972), aff'd 73-1 U.S.T.C. $ 9455 (1st Cir. 1973), the corpora-
tion retained a building beyond the twelve month period and then distributed
it to a shareholder-creditor in discharge of his debt. The Tax Court and the
appellate court held that section 337 was not applicable because no action had
been taken to set apart the building for that purpose. Clearly, wherever possi-
ble it's better to get rid of all the assets within the twelve month period and
not get involved in some of these more esoteric and potentially troublesome
problems.
One final word about this twelve month requirement. The question is often
asked as to whether the period can be extended simply by cancelling an old
plan of liquidation and adopting a new one. Suppose, for example, that a plan
of liquidation is adopted with every expectation that the corporate assets will
be sold and the proceeds distributed in liquidation well before the expiration
of twelve months, but for one reason or another the sale is postponed. Can
a new plan be adopted with a new twelve month period? Or, will the second
plan be considered simply an unlawful attempt to extend the twelve month
period? The Service's announced position is that the new plan will be considered
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a new plan if it is indeed a new plan. Now that sounds a bit like Gertrude Stein,
and it doesn't help very much. The only case on p6it held in favoro-f the
taxpayer where the postponement of the sale was beyond the control of the
taxpayer. As a practical timing matter, try very hfrd to avoid this attempted
solution when you plan. If the postponement of the sale is within the control
of the taxpayer, you should assume for planning purposes at least that a new
plan is merely a continuation of the old plan - not really a "new plan."
If the relatively modest requirements of section 337 are met, most types
of gain or loss realized by the corporation will not be recognized, but not all
types. It is important to note that a sale and liquidation under section 337 will
usually involve some amount of double tax, and to such extent it is not the
equivalent of a sale of stock.
Let's take a look at the itfayorable exceptions to non-recognition. The
sale of inventory will give rise to taxable gain or loss unless all inventory attri-
butable to a particular trade or business is sold to one purchaser in one trans-
action - a true bulk sale. Now this would usually be the case when an entire
business is sold and in such context there usually is =no problem. However, if
the inventory has been valued on the LIFO method and has been written down
below what it would be on a FIFO basis, that difference will be restored to
taxable income. It doesn't matter that the inventory is sold in bulk. Obviously,
in a sale of stock the sellers do not have this problem.
The sale of accounts receivable attributable to sales of gain assets that were
made prior to the adoption of the plan of liquidation will result in-gain-recogni-
tion. Similarly, if accrual basis receivables as to which there is a bad debt reserve
are sold for either more or less than the face amount less the reserve, the realized
gain or loss will be recognized. Most important, the recapture'of depreciation-
or cost recovery deductions or investment credits givesY-nse to taxable income
notwithstanding the applicability of section 337. This you will recall is one of
the principal factors in choosing between a sale of assets and a sale of stock..
Depreciation recapture can be a large item and in an asset deal the tax burden
will be on the sellers. Section 337 is simply no help at all.
The significance of this item is illustrated by the hypothetical balance sheet
of XYZ Corporation. Let's review the relevant items. The Corporation has
vehicles that originally cost $12,000, and $2,000 in depreciation has been taken.
The net book value is $10,000. The assumed fair market value, however, is
the same - $10,000 - so there will be no depreciation recapture with respect
to the vehicles. Similarly the office furniture has been depreciated by $4,000,
but the net book value and the fair market value are identical. So, there is
no recapture. But the machinery and equipment have an assumed fair market
of $400,000 and a net book value of only $325,000, so the difference of $75,000
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The real estate has also been depreciated by $200,000 and its fair market
,,alue is, again by assumption, $175,000 more than its net book value. But if
the corporation has been taking straight line depreciation, which is usually the
case but not always, none of that difference will be recaptured with real estate.
If, however, it has been using a depreciation or cost recovery method other
than straight line, a part of that prior depreciation may be recoverable. The
point is that recapture, to the extent it would be applicable on any kind of
sale, is not eliminated or even affected by section 337. In some cases that can
be a very important item.
Small tools and other items that were expensed when purchased are not
affected by section 337. Any part of the purchase price allocated to expensed
items will give rise to ordinary income to the selling corporation. If you repre-
sent the seller and there is any flexibility whatsoever in allocating the purchase
price away from expensed items you will certainly want to do that.
Similarly, the sale of contract rights representing income already earned
will be taxed to the selling corporation, notwithstanding section 337. For
example, the sale of rights under an uncompleted construction contract will
give rise to taxable income to the extent that the selling corporation has per-
formed services under the contract which have not yet resulted in reportable
taxable income.
It is absolutely essential as a business adviser to be aware of these excep-
tions to section 337. If only one party to a purchase and sale is aware of these
differences it is very likely that the other party will have a substantially different
after-tax result than that for which it bargained. If both parties are aware of
these tax aspects, the negotiated purchase price and the negotiated allocation
of the purchase price among the different categories of assets will reflect a com-
promise that is acceptable to both parties. That's the way it should be.
Contrary to some popular misconceptions, section 337 deals only with the
tax consequences to a liquidating corporation when it sells assets in the course
of liquidating. It does not cover all of the tax consequences to the liquidating
corporation. The liquidation itself, the distribution by the corporation of all
of its assets to its shareholders, is governed by section 336. Under section 336
and its judicial embellishments the liquidating corporation may have recognized
gain simply on account of distributing certain assets to its shareholders rather
than selling them. Stated differently, there can be a double tax consequence
in an asset deal where some of the assets are not sold but instead are distributed
in kind to one or more of the shareholders.
Our concern at this point is with the unwanted asset, such as an invest-
ment portfolio or a separate business that the purchaser does not want. Or,
perhaps the shareholders of the selling corporation do not want to part with
some real estate held by the corporation. In any of these situations, one or
more asset will be distributed in kind to the shareholders rather than being
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sold to the purchaser. Happily; the general rule under section 336 is that the
liquidating corporation does not realize gain or loss when it distributes an asset
in kind. Appreciation in value is not taxed to the corporation even though,
of course, it enters into the recipient shareholder's computation of gain or loss.
Thus, if the unwanted asset is an investment portfolio that has a greater fair
market value than cost, that appreciation will not be taxed to the corporation.
This is the favorable general rule that must be contrasted with the adverse
rule that will generally apply in a sale of stock. Iii that event, the unwanted
assetsmight be distributed in redemption of a portion of the corporation's stock,
the famous Zenz transaction. Where an appreciated asset is used to redeem
a portion of stock incident to a sale of the balance of the stock, the apprecia-
tion may be taxed to the corporation, unless section 338 is elected by the pur-
chasing corporation. But in an asset deal with a distribution in kind of an ap-
preciated investment portfolio in complete liquidation, there simply is no recogni-
tion of gain at the corporate level. Also, consistently with the favorable general
rule, the liquidating corporation may distribute installment obligations arising
on account of the section 337 sale without accelerating the unreported gain.
This is true, however, only if the installment obligation is attributable to a sale
under section 337. If it's an installment obligation that arose prior to the adop-
tion of the plan of liquidation, the distribution in kind of that obligation will
accelerate recognition of the gain to the corporation.
There are other imortant exceptionso th f le-ger rue-fc-
tion 336. Perhaps the-mn-ost important exception i depreciation recapture,that
ugly old monster. If the liquidating corporation wo ld-have-been-btdened
with depreciation recapture if it had sold depreciable property at its fair market
value, then-the distribution in kind will similarly give rise to depreciation recap-
ture to the very same extent. If the unwanted asset is depreciable real property
and depreciation has been taken on the straight line method, there will be no
recapture whether the property is sold or distributed in kind, and this is likely
to be the case with unwanted real estate, but not always. If the unwanted asset
is depreciable personal property such as machinery and equipment or
automobiles or the office computer and the fair value is more than the net
book value, depreciation recapture will clearly apply even though there is a
distribution in kind of that very asset. Also, the distribution in kind of LIFO
inventory will result in taxable gain to the corporation to the extent of the LIFO
credit just as though the inventory had been sold. In addition, the distribution
in kind of an expensed asset in the small tools category will result in taxable
income to the corporation to the extent of the fair market value of such assets.
A more difficult exception to the favorable general rule of section 336)
is the judicial assignment of income doctrine. We touched briefly on this con-
cept earlier in the context of a sale under section 337. You will recall that when
a liquidating corporation sells its business assets and those assets include a right
to income already earned even though not yet reportable under the selling cor-
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poration's method of accounting, consideration properly allocable to that in-
come right will be taxed notwithstanding section 337. This same adverse rule
may apply if the corporation simply distributes a right to earned income to
its shareholders. Now this is not likely to be a problem in the context of our
present discussion - the sale of an entire corporate business. Ordinarily the
right to the earned income will be sold along with the business assets rather
than being distributed in kind. But it can be a problem.
Suppose for example, that the unwanted asset is a warehouse building that
the shareholders of the selling corporation want to retain because it's an easy
business to continue. The corporation is on the accrual method of accounting
so that it normally accrues its income when it bills its customers. At the time
of liquidation the corporation has performed warehousing services that would
entitle it to $20,000 of income, but the corporation has not yet billed its
customers for those services. Will it nevertheless be taxed on $20,000 of income
by virtue of distributing the warehouse and the right to the earned income to
its shareholders? There is authority to this effect, but the rule is not at all clear
in the context of a distribution in kind. Must the income be fully earned from
the particular venture or is a partial earning enough? What if the services are
billed by the shareholders two years later? Does the substantial gap in timing
between the liquidation and the billing prevent the application of the rule? Does
the absence of a tax motive in timing the liquidation to occur before the accrual
at the corporate level make a difference? We don't have mathematically precise
rules in this area. We must simply accept that in appropriate cases there is an
element of risk. The greater the gut feeling that a tax should be imposed upon
the corporation, the greater the risk, and that's about as clear as we can be
on that one.
Up until now we have been looking at the selling corporation in the attempt
to avoid a double tax on an asset sale. At the shareholder level there will almost
certainly be a recognized taxable event. The general rule is -that the shareholders
of the liquidating corporation must report as capital gain or capital loss the
difference between the fair market value of the assets received by them and
their bases in their stock. In brief, it's just as though they had sold their stock
for an amount equal to the fair market value of the liquidating distribution.
Indeed, it was precisely this general rule that made installment sales extremely
burdensome in an asset deal prior to 1980. The selling corporation itself was
usually able to elect installment reporting, and if the installment note arose
by virtue of a sale under section 337 the distribution of the note in liquidation
did not trigger the recognition of gain to the corporation. But the fair market
value of the note, usually its face value, entered into the computation of gain
to the shareholders. Now this adverse rule was liberalized in 1980, thank
goodness, so that an installment sale of assets followed by a liquidation is just
as feasible as an installment sale of stock. If the installment note recieved by
the corporation by virtue of the sale under secticn 337 is distributed in liquidation
to the shareholders, it is the receipt of payments under the note, not the receipt
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of the note itself, that is taken into account in computing the shareholders'
gain or loss.
Suppose, for example, that Mr. A is the sole shareholder of X corpora-
tion. He has a basis of $50,000 in his stock. X adopts a plan of liquidation
and sells all of its assets for $500,000. Only $20,000 is paid in cash, with the
balance of $480,000 represented by a 10 year note payable in annual installments.
Within twleve months X liquidates the distributes the cash of $20,000 and the
promissory note to Mr. A. A will apply the $20,000 in cash in reduction of
his $50,000 in basis in his stock and will allocate the remaining $30,000 basis
to the installment note. Each payment of principal on the note will be capital
gain to the extent it exceeds a proportionate part of A's basis in that note.
In our hypothetical that would mean 93.750%0 of each principal payment will
be capital gain, and 6.25% will be a non-taxable return of basis. Except for
the fact that A must apply the cash received in liquidation to an immediate
recovery of of stock basis rather than proportionately over the term of the note,
his treatment of the installment note is exactly the same as though he had sold
his stock for deferred payments, a very important liberalization.
Using section 337 is the most common way of minimizing or limiting the
double tax in an asset deal. Sometimes, however, there is a better way. If the
selling corporation is not liquidated, there cannot be a double tax. Not only
is there clearly only one taxable event at the corporate level, but in many asset
deals there will be no tax at all or a very modest one, if any. Where the basis
of the shareholder's stock is low in relation to the sale price, which is usually
the case, and the basis of the corporation's assets is high in relation to the sale
price, again which is usually the case, an alternative to section 337 must at
least be seriously considered.
In most sales of businesses today, as contrasted with twenty years ago,
the sale price is likely to be not much more than book value of the corporate
assets. If so, the gain at the corporate level will be little or nothing, but if the
dominant shareholders of the selling corporation are the original shareholders,
their stock basis is likely to be low so that a liquidation will result in a large
capital gain tax. This tax at the shareholder level can be avoided by not
liquidating. If we add the further fact that the sole or dominant shareholder
is elderly, not liquidating may be the ideal answer. If our shareholder is lucky
enough to die within a few years (lucky guy) his stock will get a stepped-up
basis by virtue of death and a later liquidation can be effected completely tax
free. The after-tax income yield to the shareholders might be substantially greater
than it would be if the corporation had been liquidated.
Consider this example; Mr. A is the sole shareholder of X corporation.
X has total assets minus debts worth $1 million with a book value of $1 million.
A's basis in his stock, however, is only $10,000. X sells all of its assets subject
to its liabilities for $1 million in cash. Now if X is liquidated, A will have a
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capital gain of $990,000 and a capital gain tax of $198,000. His net in pocket
will be $802,000, not $1 million. If he invests that $802,000 in dividend-paying
stocks with an average yield of 10%, he will have a pre tax income of $80,000.
If we assume that all of this income is taxed at the highest bracket, his after-
tax annual income will be $40,000 attributable to his prior ownership of X.
But compare this with not liquidating. X corporation has no gain on
account of the sale, so that the full $1 million is available for the same kind
of investment, that is, in dividend-paying stocks yielding 10% before taxes.
The corporation's dividend income is $100,000, 10% of a million, but only
$15,000 will enter into the corporation's taxable income. So the total corporate
tax will be only $2,000. It will have $98,000 to distribute to A. After his tax
at 50% he has $49,000 in pocket, 22% more than if he had liquidated and
made the identical investment. Now, of course, this alternative has one very
great disadvantage. The sale dollars are in the corporate till, not in the
shareholders' own pockets. For a minority shareholder, this is not likely to
be at all satisfactory. Even a majority shareholder, who has a relatively long
life expectancy, is not likely to want to be burdened with a private investment
company for many, many years. But often minority shareholders can be
redeemed out; the dominant shareholder can thus become the sole shareholder,
and he is likely to be elderly. So this alternative is far more useful than one
might think at first blush.
What about personal holding company status? That penalty tax must be
avoided at all costs. It is inconceivable that this technique will be desirable if
it results in the imposition of the personal holding company penalty tax.
Generally, avoiding that penalty means one of three alternatives. If the invest-
ment income is distributed out to the shareholders at least annually there will
be no penalty tax. The tax is on accumulated personal holding company in-
come. The distribution, of course will be taxable as a dividend to the
shareholders, so it will usually be important to avoid a significant tax at the
corporate level. A substantial double tax on investment income is not likely
to be tolerable. That's why in the example that we just went through, the
assumption was that the corporation would invest in stocks. Dividend income
is very lightly taxed at the corporate level so there will be very little double tax.
Another alternative is to invest substantially in real estate. If the corpora-
tion's income is primarily rental income and it does not have a significant amount
of other types of investment income, its undistributed income will not be sub-
ject to the penalty tax. But unless its rental activities constitute an active trade
or business, the corporation could become subject to the seciton 531 tax on
unreasonable accumulations of income. Also, if the shareholders are not already
experienced real estate investors, they are not likely to want to become real
estate investors simply to avoid the capital gain tax incident to a liquidation.
Many of us think, of course, that all real estate investors automatically get
rich, but those who don't know what they are doing can find out there is a
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jungle out there.
A third alternative is to cause the corporation to invest in tax free bonds
and to accumulate the bond interest at the corporate level. This is not likely
to be attractive if the shareholders need the current income, but sometimes,
as you know, elderly shareholders who sell their corporate business are wealthy
quite apart from the corporation. They don't need the income. In that event,
causing the corporation to grow fatter and fatter each year for the no-good
children and grandchildren might be the actually desired objective. The bottom
line is that there is usually an acceptable method of dealing with the personal
holding company problem. The private investment company alternative to liqui-
dating can, in proper circumstances, be a welcome tax saving device. It is like-
ly to be appealing to the client in those situations where the postponement of
capital gain tax will probably mean the avoidance of tax - where the shareholder
can hold on to his shares until he dies. So much for the asset deal.
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CORPORATE ASSET AND STOCK ACQUISITIONS:
QUESTION AND ANSWER SESSION
HARVEY FRUTKIN AND ZOLMAN CAVITCH
Fruitkin
One thing that was presented not so much as a question but as a point
of interest, and I think it's well taken, is that in a stock purchase there may
be an unknown liability relating to a pension plan maintained by the selling
corporation. When we think of the unknown liability problem, that is the pur-
chaser's risk of overpayment for stock, we most commonly use examples such
as Federal Income Tax liabilities or uninsured potential lawsuit liabilities that
are unknown. But I agree with the point made that the selling corporation may
sponsor a qualified plan, and specifically a pension plan, that involves liabilities
which can be taken into account if the purchaser is aware of those liabilities.
For example, the pension plan may involve past service costs that become a
liability upon adoption of the plan. If that liability is not known then the pur-
chaser might inadvertently become liable for something that wasn't anticipated.
So I agree that can be an important point.
Here is a question that has come up twice here. The question is, "Should
mention be made of the consolidated return rules when looking to see if net
operating losses can be carried forward where the target corporation becomes
part of a consolidated group?" We should mention that. The idea there I sup-
pose is that the corporation will acquire a loss corporation by purchasing its
stock and then will want to, or will attempt to, file a consolidated return on
which the losses of the acquired corporation will be offset against the profits
of the purchaser. That won't work under the "separate return limitation year"
rules. The idea here is that the losses of the acquired corporation were created
before the acquisition in a separate return limitation year and thus cannot be
used to offset future profits on a consolidated return filed by the purchaser.
Cavitch
Incidentally, in handling these questions I would certainly welcome any
kind of debate or difference of opinion, since some are obviously questions
that have not been researched by either Harvey or myself prior to this time.
They are not planted questions.
The next question is, "In an asset deal if accounts receivable are not sold,
will the bad debt reserve be picked up by the liquidating corporation? What
is the result if the accounts receivable are distributed to shareholders? Will the
shareholders pick up the reserve as ordinary income? Can the reserve be con-
verted to capital gain?" This is all part of the bad debt reserve question. Until
a few years ago there was substantial litigation on the question of whether the
bad debt reserve was automatically added to income when accounts receivable
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subject to a bad debt reserve were either sold or distributed in kind. The rule
now, again by virtue of Supreme Court decision, is that the bad debt reserve
is not automatically restored to income when it is distributed to shareholders;
it's really a question of whether the bad debt reserve is excessive. If the bad
debt reserve is a realistic reserve, then it is not restored to income; the
shareholders are simply treated as having received the net amount, that is,
normally the face amount less the reserve. The reserve simply disappears at
the corporate level but it is not restored to income. That's my recollection of
the Supreme Court's decision on that.
Another related kind of question involves an asset deal. "What if the deal
calls for the seller to accrue certain liabilities to the closing date, such as vaca-
tion pay (good example), and such liabilities are paid by the seller by way of
set-off to the purchase price? The purchase price is, in effect, reduced - since
the liability is taken over by the purchaser. Can the selling corporation obtain
a deduction for such liability since it is paid to the purchaser?" The answer,
I'm quite sure, is yes. That is to say, even though the vacation pay is not actually
paid at that point to the employees, it has in effect been paid by means of
a lesser purchase price actually received by the seller. If I recall correctly, a
fairly recent case that deals with exactly that question allows the deduction
in that kind of a situation.
Frutkin
Here's a question on the Zenz transaction, part sale/parat redemption,
as a technique for distributing unwanted assets to the selling shareholders. The
question is, "What happens if 90% of the target's shares are redeemed and
the redemption price is fully leveraged, that is, all that the shareholders receive
is the note of the target to be paid in the future? What if the purchasing cor-
poration guarantees that note? Is there anything wrong with that?" Offhand,
I don't think so. It seems to me that the first issue is whether it is all right
to have 90% of the shares of the target redeemed and only 10% sold, and it
is. In Herbert Enoch v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 781 (1972), 5% of the shares
were sold and 95% redeemed. It is also all right for the target to have distributed
in the redemption its note as opposed to cash. And it seems all right to me
that the purchaser guarantees the debt of the target, because when the smoke
clears away all we are saying is that there has been a part sale and part redemp-
tion in accordance with the normal rules, and the shareholders redeemed have
an assurance that eventually they will be paid for the stock that they redeemed.
I don't see a problem with it.-
I have a question on section 269. "If there is a stock purchase, a section
338 election is made, and a gain is deemed to be recognized by the target under
section 337 (remember that is the effect of the election respecting, for example,
depreciation recapture) will sheltering of the gain by the target's net operating
loss carryover create a problem under section 269?" I think it does. The loss
carryover is being used directly and immediately as a benefit to the purchaser.
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So I think it is a problem, although I admit section 338 is too new for the issue
to have been to our attention through any reported cases, what do you think,
Zol?
Cavitch
Isn't it hard to say that the purchaser has acquired control for the pur-
pose of utilizing that carryover when the gain was simply triggered by the elec-
tion itself?
Frutkin
But for the net operating loss carryover, the effective gain recognized by
the target would have been an expense to the purchaser, and so at least in-
directly the acquisition of control works to its benefit in that respect. I also
mention that since section 338 is so new I've never seen that kind of an issue,
have you?
Cavitch
Oh, no. There certainly isn't any kind of a case or ruling that's come down
yet. That's certainly an interesting question; I don't know. There certainly could
be a section 269 exposure. I have a feeling, however, that the principal pur-
pose requirement under section 269 probably wouldn't be met.
Frutkin
Zol, what about the situation involving allocations, where the seller has
a hidden inventory of a million dollars? The inventory on his books says
$800,000 but its really worth $1,800,000. How do you handle a situation like
that, if at all?
Cavitch
I think that is an example of a situation where there could be a risk -
a very real audit risk, because where the inventory is, in fact, worth a good
deal more than it was stated on the books of the seller, there is a bulk sale
under section 337, and we don't have LIFO inventory. The seller doesn't have
any recognized gain on account of that sale of inventory at a large profit, if
the contract of sale actually allocates the real fair market value to the inven-
tory. On the other hand, the purchaser will have a cost for that inventory equal
to what it pays so that both parties will be benefited. In that situation an alloca-
tion of fair market value to the inventory will leave the Government supposedly
in short shrift. The Government's argument there, however, is likely to be that
where the sale of inventory is at a substantial profit to the seller, that the in-
ventory was written down excessively in years prior to the sale and to the ex-
tent that those years are still open, and some of them certainly will be, an audit
of the liquidating corporation will certainly pose a risk of inventory adjustments.
This is not because of the gain from the sale as such but because the inventory
has been excessively written down.
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An interesting question arises under section 337 respecting problems with
drafting corporate minutes: "Are there any ethical problems with the drafting
of corporate minutes? What do you do for a one or two man corporation when
the people enter your office and say 'two days ago we decided to liquidate and
yesterday we sold our assets'. Is dating the minutes two days ago a fraud?"
Well, surely back-dating something that really wasn't true is a fraud. I don't
think there is any question about that, just as a general proposition. The thing
that makes this a not-so-cut-and-dry proposition is that a plan of liquidation
is adopted by shareholder action. But that doesn't mean that the minutes
themselves are that action. Normally a meeting must be called if there is no
written action statute. In an actual meeting, done the way the big companies
do, a notice is sent out, a meeting date is set, people come together, resolu-
tions are presented and voted on, and so forth. But what if you have two people
who meet in the hallway one day and say, "Don't you think it's time to sell
the assets and distribute out everything to ourselves?" They shake hands and
say, "Yes, let's get out of business and let's do that." But they don't have
the lawyers draft a resolution embodying in writing what they have already
in effect orally done until 2 or 3 or 5 or 10 days later. Is that a fraud? I don't
think it is if that's the fact. Now the difficulty is that what is fact and what
is fiction is what the client tells you it is. What is your duty as a lawyer to
say, "Well, if I wasn't present at that so-called meeting, I can't draft the
minutes"? Is it necessary to go that far? I honestly don't know. I would welcome
whatever thoughts you might have on this. I have a feeling that many lawyers
will take the word of their clients that a decision was made in their private
offices. I think most of us would say, "Well, who am I to tell them they are
liars?"
Henry Nagel (Moderator)
Just one comment on that , Zol, from the point of view of one who has
been on both sides of the street as a lawyer and as a CPA. I was talking to
someone yesterday who observed that lawyers are more transaction oriented,
since they don't see the client until the client comes in and says, "I'm doing
this," or "I've done this, so work on it," whereas the CPA is the one who
is there weekly or monthly with the client and should be the one who has the
obligation to talk to the attorney at a time before these transactions come about.
I think that is an illustration of how the lawyer and CPA can and should work
hand-in-hand in coordinating these kinds of activities to make sure that there
is no potential ethical problem down the road.
Cavitch
Yes, indeed, I think you have a point. But what has happened in my
experience, at least, is that the people have sold the assets of the corporation
without the advice of a CPA or a lawyer and months later, literally many months
later, indeed perhaps even a year or two later, they come in and they say, "Well,
we did this, now what do we do?" I don't believe a lawyer should back-date
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minutes after months or years to try to justify a section 337 plan. I wouldn't
do it.
Frutkin
I have an "Andy Rooney" type question. It starts out like this, "How
was this sneaked into the law? It is reported that the transformation of section
334(b)(2) into section 338 was accomplished without committee hearings. Do
you know whose idea it was?" I don't know. I didn't even know it was
accomplished without committee hearings and I just don't know much about
that situation. But as a matter of fact, contrary to the tone of the question,
section 338 is probably a good thing. It is a good substitute for section 334(b)(2)
because it allows essentially the same thing to happen as did happen under section
334(b)(2), but you don't have to go through a liquidation if you don't desire
one. If you want to keep the target as a separate corporation, you can. You
can still get the step-up in basis of the assets. The net operating loss disappears,
of course, but that's true, again, in either event. So I think section 338 was
probably a good thing.
We've got another question here that is really quite good. And the ques-
tion is: "When a section 338 election is important to the selling corporation's
shareholder who gets appreciated assets distributed in kind, do you recommend
that the seller negotiate into the purchase agreement a requirement that the
purchaser make the section 338 election? What happens if this is required and
the purchaser does not make the election?" The question is phrased in terms
of the section 338 election being important to the shareholder who is receiving
the unwanted asset, but this is not likely to be important to that person and
here's why not, generally speaking. If the section 338 election is not made and
thus the distribution of an asset triggers a tax to the target corporation, it seems
to me the cost of the tax automatically falls upon the purchaser. The selling
shareholder who received the unwanted asset is presumably under the rules of
section 302(b)(3) and is going to have capital gain to the extent of whatever
he receives. So, I don't think he has a problem.
However, I can see that careful drafting might be important. For example,
it might be appropriate for the purchase agreement to describe who bears the
cost of whatever tax is generated by the section 338 election, including deprecia-
tion recapture under the section 337 rules. Presumably that will be the pur-
chaser's cost, but how the agreement is drafted could make a difference. For
example, such cost could be deemed an expense of the seller, so careful drafting
has a place. The question does ask what happens if the election is required
and the purchaser does not make it. Well, if the purchaser was required by
contract to make the election but didn't, I suppose it would have breached
the contract and the seller should call a lawyer.
Here are a couple of questions that fit together nicely: one is, "Is there
any way to get rid of unwanted assets but keep them in corporate solution?"
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The other is, "Would it not make sense to utilize the devisive reorganization
to eliminate unwanted assets provided the requirements of section 355 are met?"
Yes. I think section 355 can be used. There are some risks, however, depen-
ding upon what the facts are. There have been cases where a section 355 tax
free corporate division has been attempted in conjunction with a sale. The facts
involve selling XYZ Corporation, which contains unwanted assets. The selling
shareholders cause XYZ Corporation to form a subsidiary in which the un-
wanted assets are placed, with the XYZ shareholders then taking stock in the
subsidiary for themselves. Under the somewhat complicated rules of section
355, if nothing else were done that might very well be a completely tax-free
reorganization of the XYZ business into two separate corporations.
The potential problem results from the next step, which is the sale by those
shareholders of the XYZ Corporation's stock. What they want to accomplish
is to keep the unwanted assets in a corporation and yet sell the stock repre-
senting the rest of the assets, that is, the operating assets of XYZ which are
needed by the purchaser. The difficulty with the plan is simply that the section
355 rules are intended to prevent such a transaction. The section 355 require-
ments probably won't be met, because one of the rules says that the division
will be tax-free only if the transaction is not used as a device for the distribu-
tion to the shareholders of earnings and profits of the business. Of course the
scenario leads itself to a distribution of earnings and profits, because what the
shareholders are doing is selling a part of the business. So I think section 355
would involve a problem, unless the facts were just right.
Cavitch
We have a question on allocation of purchase price in an asset deal: "Are
there certain situations where the allocations should be made by the seller and
the purchaser independently, and if so when?" Again, let me just emphasize
that generally speaking it is most advisable to put the allocation of an asset
deal purchase price right in the contract for both parties to follow, so there
is less likely to be a significant challenge on audit. Unfortunately, sometimes
the parties simply cannot agree on an allocation so they resolve their disagree-
ment by each going his own way. "I think I'm paying a million dollars for
inventory, and you think I'm paying only $800,000 for inventory, so be that
as it may, you report it your way and I'll report it my way." They obviously
are inviting litigation, unless they've just successfully played audit roulette. Often
their disagreement will be resolved eventually, as a result of an audit, in a way
that's consistent with the Government's standpoint. Sometimes that's the only
course left to the parties. If they simply can't agree, they take their chances.
Here is an interesting question: "If a liquidating trust is formed by the
shareholders of a corporation electing section 337 liquidation treatment and
the trust has taxable income during its life, is the trust liable for the tax or
is the trust entitled to a distribution deduction so that the beneficiaries report
the income in the year earned by the trust?" Almost certainly, the taxation
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of the trust and its beneficiaries will be governed by the trust income tax sections
of the Code, because it is in fact a trust. The interesting question will come
up if it is not a grantor trust. That is, if the shareholders themselves create
the trust into which the corporation distributes the assets, I would think it would
be a grantor trust, so that the shareholders would be taxed proportionately
on the income of the trust each year whether or not they currently receive it,
and the trust itself would not be subject to tax. If, however, it is a trust created
by corporate officers on behalf of the shareholders, is it still a "grantor trust"?
That is, will the assets be deemed to have been distributed to the shareholders
who then created the trust as a "grantor trust"? That, I believe, is the posi-
tion of the Treasury Department. If it is valid, that means that the trust is not
taxable even on retained income, and the shareholders must personally report
the income whether or not they have received it in the current taxable year.
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